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Abstract
Background: The province of Ontario, Canada initiated mass immunization clinics with adjuvanted pandemic
H1N1 influenza vaccine in October 2009. Due to the scale of the campaign, temporal associations with Guillain-
Barré syndrome (GBS) and vaccination were expected. The objectives of this analysis were to estimate the number
of background GBS cases expected to occur in the projected vaccinated population and to estimate the number
of additional GBS cases which would be expected if an association with vaccination existed. The number of
influenza-associated GBS cases was also determined.
Methods: Baseline incidence rates of GBS were determined from published Canadian studies and applied to
projected vaccine coverage data to estimate the expected number of GBS cases in the vaccinated population.
Assuming an association with vaccine existed, the number of additional cases of GBS expected was determined by
applying the rates observed during the 1976 Swine Flu and 1992/1994 seasonal influenza campaigns in the United
States. The number of influenza-associated GBS cases expected to occur during the vaccination campaign was
determined based on risk estimates of GBS after influenza infection and provincial influenza infection rates using a
combination of laboratory-confirmed cases and data from a seroprevalence study.
Results: The overall provincial vaccine coverage was estimated to be between 32% and 38%. Assuming 38%
coverage, between 6 and 13 background cases of GBS were expected within this projected vaccinated cohort
(assuming 32% coverage yielded between 5-11 background cases). An additional 6 or 42 cases would be expected
if an association between GBS and influenza vaccine was observed (assuming 32% coverage yielded 5 or 35
additional cases); while up to 31 influenza-associated GBS cases could be expected to occur. In comparison, during
the same period, only 7 cases of GBS were reported among vaccinated persons.
Conclusions: Our analyses do not suggest an increased number of GBS cases due to the vaccine. Awareness of
expected rates of GBS is crucial when assessing adverse events following influenza immunization. Furthermore,
since individuals with influenza infection are also at risk of developing GBS, they must be considered in such
analyses, particularly if the vaccine campaign and disease are occurring concurrently.
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After the emergence of pandemic influenza in April
2009, a safe and effective vaccine needed to be devel-
oped and approved under significant time constraints.
Arepanrix™ H1N1 vaccine, an adjuvanted influenza
vaccine, was authorized for sale in Canada on October
13, 2009 [1]. It was anticipated that this vaccine would
have a similar safety profile as seasonal influenza vac-
cines; however, it contained an adjuvant that had not
been used in population-based settings in North Amer-
ica prior to the pandemic. As a result there was sugges-
tion in the popular press of public mistrust in the
vaccine [2,3]. In addition, it was recognized that due to
the scale of the campaign, being the largest immuniza-
tion campaign in Canadian history, a number of events
would be temporally associated with the vaccine regard-
less of any causal associations. It was expected that
these events would trigger intense media interest, as
well as require public health attention and resources.
Adverse event following immunization (AEFI) surveil-
lance is a critical component of any immunization pro-
gram, especially a campaign targeting the entire
population using a new vaccine with a novel adjuvant.
Safety signals are expected to occur and must be
assessed thoroughly. This is important for program
integrity, as spurious associations could undermine pub-
lic confidence. Adverse events need to be assessed in
order to determine if any causal, rather than temporal,
association exists; however, these assessments are often
time-consuming and causality is difficult to infer. This is
especially true for Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS), a
relatively rare condition that was causally-linked to the
1976 swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) vaccination cam-
paign in the United States (US) [4].
GBS is the leading cause of acute flaccid paralysis in
developed countries and is characterized by various
degrees of weakness, sensory abnormalities and auto-
nomic dysfunction [5]. The estimated annual incidence
in Canada is between 1.0 and 2.3 per 100,000 popula-
tion [6,7]. GBS can occur at any age, but incidence
increases with age, and is more common among males
than females [6]. The etiology of GBS is not completely
understood, however a number of gastrointestinal and
respiratory infectious triggers have been identified, with
Campylobacter being the most common. The risk after
Campylobacter jejuni has been estimated to be 1 case of
GBS per 1000 C. jejuni cases [8]. This can be compared
with a risk after influenza infection approximately two
orders of magnitude lower at 4-7 GBS cases per
100,000 cases of influenza. GBS has also been associated
with vaccines. A recent review of studies examining
associations between various vaccines and GBS found
that, with rare exceptions, these associations have been
only temporal, with little evidence with most vaccines
to support a causal association [5]. The evidence for a
causal association is strongest for the swine influenza
vaccine that was used in the US in 1976-77; the US
immunization program was suspended in 1976 follow-
ing increased reports of GBS after vaccine administra-
tion. Relative risks of between 4 and 8 for the 6 to 8
week post-vaccination period were demonstrated [4]. In
contrast, studies of associations between seasonal influ-
enza vaccines have found only small or no increased
risk of GBS. Lasky and co-authors estimated an
increased risk of GBS after seasonal influenza vaccina-
tion of 1 per 1,000,000 vaccinated persons [9]. Compar-
ing the risk estimates of GBS after influenza infection
to that after influenza vaccination reveals that the risk
of GBS following infection is 40 - 70 times greater than
the risk, if it exists, of GBS following seasonal influenza
vaccine [8,10].
The objectives of the analysis were to estimate the
number of background GBS cases expected to occur in
the projected vaccinated population in the province of
Ontario during the 2009 pandemic influenza immuniza-
tion campaign and to estimate the number of additional
GBS cases which would be expected if previous associa-
tions between GBS and influenza vaccines were seen.
For comparison purposes, we also estimated the number
of GBS cases that would be expected to occur among
persons infected with pandemic influenza during the
immunization campaign.
Methods
W ec o n d u c t e da ne c o l o g i ca n a l y s i si nt h ep r o v i n c eo f
Ontario during the second wave of the influenza pan-
demic (Figure 1).
Background cases of GBS among vaccinated cohort
Expected background rates of GBS were determined from
two Canadian sources and applied to the Ontario popula-
tion (12.8 million) using a method similar to that described
by Black and co-authors [11]. Juurlink and co-authors
reported a rate of 1.4 per 100,000 in Ontario and Hauck
and co-authors reported age-sex adjusted GBS rates over
an 11 year period of between 0.97 to 2.32 per 100,000 per
year in Alberta [6,7]. The Alberta range was used for calcu-
lating the background rates as the Ontario point estimate
was included within. The rates include GBS cases from all
causes. The expected number of GBS cases applies to the
entire population unless otherwise stated. Ontario demo-
graphic data were obtained from Statistics Canada [12].
GBS is not a reportable condition in Ontario. There-
fore in order to determine the number of expected tem-
porally-reported GBS cases among vaccinated persons,
we estimated the number of H1N1 vaccine doses admi-
nistered in the province (i.e., vaccine coverage) and then
applied the background GBS rates to estimate the
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Page 2 of 9number of expected GBS cases that would occur in the
vaccinated cohort over time. Local public health units in
the province delivered the vast majority of doses of vac-
cine through H1N1 vaccination clinics held between
approximately October 26 and December 27, 2009; how-
ever, vaccine was also delivered through other delivery
agents including physicians and through community
influenza clinics offered by community health centres,
community care access centres, hospitals, long-term
care homes, as well as pharmacy-based clinics and
workplace clinics. The end date of the clinics varied by
health unit and tended to be demand driven and some
vaccine delivery continued beyond December 2009.
The projected distribution of the vaccinated population
within the first nine weeks of the campaign (October 26 to
December 27, 2009) was based on publicly available data
[13-15]. The overall provincial coverage estimate during
the second wave of the pandemic was assumed to be 38%,
based on publications from the Ontario Ministry of Health
and Long-Term Care [14,15]. For comparison, as a form
of sensitivity analysis, 32% coverage was also considered
[16,17]. Next, the distribution of the weekly number of
doses administered was based on the weekly number of
doses distributed to Ontario, as reported by the Public
Health Agency of Canada [13]. Keeping the cumulative
coverage fixed at 32% or 38%, the weekly number of doses
distributed was then multiplied by a series of parameter
estimates believed to reflect the variability in public
demand, capacity and contributions of vaccine delivery
agents across the province, to derive the projected weekly
distribution of the vaccinated cohort. To determine the
expected number of GBS cases occurring among vacci-
nated persons, the expected number of cases in the popu-
lation was multiplied by the estimated vaccine coverage.
We assumed that the daily/weekly rate of developing GBS
was constant. A vaccinated person was considered as eligi-
ble for having an incident diagnosis of GBS from 1 to 6
weeks following vaccination as this is typically the risk per-
iod considered for GBS and vaccination [4,7,9]. GBS cases
occurring during the same week as vaccination would not
be associated with vaccination. As a weekly rate was used,
a vaccinated cohort would be eligible to be diagnosed with
GBS in each of the six weeks after vaccination; after which
any GBS case would be considered independent of vacci-
nation and thus were no longer eligible to contribute to
the burden. Therefore, the period of interest for this inves-
tigation (i.e., the period in which GBS cases associated
with vaccination could be expected to occur), was between
November 2, 2009 and February 7, 2010. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.
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Figure 1 Epidemic curve of laboratory-confirmed H1N1 cases in Ontario during the 2nd wave (N = 5,029).
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vaccinated cohort
The number of additional cases of GBS expected among
the vaccinated cohort if an association was seen which
was similar to either that experienced during the 1976
vaccination campaign or during the 1992/1993 and
1993/1994 seasonal campaigns was determined by
applying the rates identified by Schonberger and co-
authors, and Lasky and co-authors, respectively, to the
vaccinated population [4,9]. The following formula was
used to estimate the total number of additional GBS
cases that might be expected to occur among individuals
who were vaccinated during the first nine weeks of the
campaign:
Number of GBS cases =
9 
i=1
i+6 
j=i+1
cohorti × riskj−i,
where
￿ i denotes the week in which the projected cohort
of individuals was vaccinated
￿ j denotes the number of weeks relative to the start
of the immunization campaign
￿ cohorti: projected number of individuals vaccinated
in week i
￿ riskj-i = risk of GBS j-i weeks after vaccination
For comparison, the number of GBS cases reported to
t h ep r o v i n c et h r o u g ht h ei n t e g r a t e dP u b l i cH e a l t h
Information System (iPHIS) by local public health units
as part of their passive surveillance of AEFI during the
period of interest (as defined above) was obtained from
the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
(MOHLTC). Reported cases of GBS were assessed by
the MOHLTC using the Brighton Criteria based on a
review of consultation notes of the attending neurologist
and laboratory results.
Estimated number of GBS cases among persons
infections with influenza
The number of GBS cases expected to occur as a result
of influenza infection was determined based on risk esti-
mates of GBS after influenza-like illness (ILI) identified
by Stowe and co-authors [10]. These rates were applied
to estimates of the cumulative incidence of influenza
infection in the population of Ontario using two differ-
ent sources of data. The first estimate was the number
of laboratory confirmed influenza cases occurring in
Ontario between October 3, 2009 and February 7, 2010.
This time period was selected as GBS cases have
occurred between 0 and 30 days after ILI [10]. There-
fore influenza cases occurring between the aforemen-
tioned dates could result in GBS cases being reported
during the period of interest (November 2, 2009 and
February 7, 2010). This is also illustrated in Figure 2.
Laboratory-confirmed cases were determined from the
public health laboratory-based information system Lab-
ware. As testing for H1N1 also occurred within private
laboratories and hospitals, the data from Labware
Period of interest:   
Period in which GBS cases associated with 
vaccination within the first 9 weeks of the 
campaign and influenza infection could be 
expected to occur 
Period in which influenza infection could be associated with GBS 
cases during the “period of interest” 
Oct.  
26 
Nov. 
2 
Dec. 
27 
Feb. 
7 
Oct. 
3 
First 9 weeks of immunization campaign 
1 week  6 weeks 
30 days 
Figure 2 Relevant timelines of interest in GBS analysis.
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firmed cases in Ontario during the second wave of the
pandemic, relative to data captured within the provincial
surveillance information system iPHIS (unpublished
data). However, access to laboratory testing was limited
d u r i n gt h es e c o n dw a v eo ft h ep a n d e m i ca n dw o u l d
underestimate both population infection and influenza-
associated GBS cases. Furthermore, laboratory-con-
firmed cases will exclude those who were infected but
d i dn o tg e tt e s t e df o rt h e i ri l l n e s s .T h e r e f o r ew ea l s o
used data from a seroprevalence study conducted in
Ontario to gain a more comprehensive estimate of the
number of cases of influenza occurring in the province
that includes a broader spectrum of illness that is also
not sensitive to laboratory testing changes. The seropre-
valence study, which was based on hemagglutination
inhibition assay testing, revealed that 13.7% of Ontarian
adults who did not report receiving H1N1 vaccine were
infected during the second wave [18]. We applied this
proportion to the estimated unvaccinated Ontario popu-
lation to determine the totaln u m b e ro fn e wi n f l u e n z a
cases occurring between October 3, 2009 and February
7, 2010. We then applied the distribution of laboratory-
confirmed cases to this total value to derive the daily
number of new influenza cases during the same period.
Lastly, using the relative risk estimate (16.64) for GBS in
the 0 to 30 days following ILI, as reported by Stowe and
co-authors [10], we assumed that the daily risk during
this 31-day period was constant and applied this to the
daily number of influenza cases in order to derive daily
estimates of GBS cases associated with influenza
infection.
Results
The distribution of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases
in Ontario during the second wave of the pandemic is
provided in Figure 1. During the 9 weeks of Ontario’s
H1N1 vaccination campaign (i.e., between October 26-
December 27, 2009), between 22 and 52 GBS cases were
expected to occur in the province in its entirety, based
on the background rates of all-cause GBS. We projected
that by December 27, 2009, between 4.2 and 5 million
Ontarians (between 32%-38% of the population), were
vaccinated. Table 1 reveals the estimated baseline num-
ber of GBS cases occurring among vaccinated indivi-
duals by week of the campaign, starting one week after
campaign commencement and extending 6 weeks
beyond campaign conclusion. Assuming 38% coverage,
we estimated that between 6 and 13 coincidental cases
of GBS should have occurred among vaccinated persons
during the period of interest (November 2, 2009 to Feb-
ruary 7, 2010). By comparison, between 5 and 11 coinci-
dental GBS cases should have occurred if 32% coverage
was assumed. During the same time period, 7 cases of
GBS were reported among vaccinated persons in the
province.
Assuming 38% coverage, if an association between
GBS and influenza vaccine similar to that seen in 1976
was observed, we would expect to see an additional 42
cases of GBS over baseline among the vaccinated popu-
lation (Table 2), for a total of between 48 and 55 cases
GBS cases. If, however, an association was seen that was
similar to previous seasonal influenza vaccine, we would
expect an additional 6 cases during the same time per-
iod, for a total of between 12 and 19 GBS cases among
the vaccinated population. Estimates assuming 32% cov-
erage were similar, though slightly lower (between 5 and
35 additional cases).
There were 5,029 laboratory confirmed cases of influ-
enza occurring in Ontario between September 1, 2009
and February 7, 2010, however only 4,921 (97.9%)
occurred between October 3 2009 and February 7, 2010,
the time period in which influenza infection could have
been associated with GBS cases during the “period of
interest”. These latter influenza cases would have been
associated with less than 1 (0.06-0.14) GBS case. Sero-
prevalence data revealed that 13.7% of unvaccinated
individuals (N = 1,110,097 assuming 38% coverage) were
newly infected with influenza during the second wave of
the pandemic. This would have resulted in 1,087,862
influenza cases which would be associated with between
12.9 and 30.8 GBS cases during the period of interest.
Therefore when taking both methods of estimating
influenza illness into account, during the same time per-
iod examined for the vaccinated cohort, between 0.06
and 30.8 GBS cases could be expected to be associated
with influenza infection within the unvaccinated
population.
Discussion
This study estimated the expected number of GBS cases
during and after the H1N1 mass vaccination campaign
in Ontario, Canada. We propose a method to estimate
these cases based on vaccine coverage, number of influ-
enza infections and the respective timing of each in the
population.
In Ontario, 7 cases of GBS were reported among vac-
cinated persons during the period of interest. This was
well within the expected background rate of GBS esti-
mated in this study and does not suggest an increased
number of GBS cases due to the vaccine. Elsewhere in
Canada and internationally there have been similar con-
clusions. In an April 27, 2010 web posting, the Public
Health Agency of Canada, indicated that 31 GBS cases
had been reported following vaccination in Canada
(approximately 1.2 cases per million doses distributed)
a n dt h a tc o n c e r n sa b o u tG B Sh a dn o te m e r g e di nc o n -
nection with H1N1 vaccines [19]. In Sweden, as of April
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would be expected considering the size of the vaccinated
population [20]. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, 10
GBS cases were reported until March 16, 2010, and it
was concluded that there was no evidence across Europe
that H1N1 vaccines caused GBS [21]. In the US, Vel-
lozzi and co-authors found that the GBS reporting rates
among persons vaccinated with pandemic vaccine was
less than the expected background GBS rates [22]. How-
ever, an earlier US publication by Prothro and co-
authors reported preliminary results of surveillance for
GBS after receipt of H1N1 vaccine which revealed an
elevated, statistically significant association between
2009 H1N1 vaccination and GBS and an attributable
risk of 0.8 excess cases of GBS per 1 million vaccina-
tions; importantly, 59% of the vaccinees also reported
Table 1 Baseline number of GBS cases among vaccinated individuals, November 2, 2009 - February 7, 2010
Week of Vaccination Campaign Projected number of individuals vaccinated in
Ontario
Projected cumulative baseline number of GBS
cases
32% coverage 38% coverage 32% coverage 38% coverage
Week 1: Oct 26 - Nov 1 240,322 285,382 N/A N/A
Week 2: Nov 2 - Nov 8 418,444 496,902 0.04 - 0.11 0.05 - 0.13
Week 3: Nov 9 - 15 519,186 616,533 0.17 - 0.40 0.20 - 0.48
Week 4: Nov 16 - 22 970,861 1,152,898 0.39 - 0.93 0.46 - 1.1
Week 5: Nov 23 - 29 1,057,184 1,255,406 0.79 - 1.9 0.94 - 2.2
Week 6: Nov 30 - Dec 6 634,192 753,103 1.4 - 3.3 1.6 - 3.9
Week 7: Dec 7 - 13 239,874 284,850 2.1 - 5.0 2.5 - 6.0
Week 8: Dec 14 - 20 72,191 85,726 2.8 - 6.7 3.3 - 8.0
Week 9: Dec 21 - 27 29,887 35,491 3.5 - 8.3 4.1 - 9.9
Week 10: Dec 28 - Jan 3 0 0 4.0 - 9.6 4.8 - 11.4
Week 11: Jan 4 - 10 0 0 4.4 - 10.5 5.2 - 12.5
Week 12: Jan 11 - 17 0 0 4.6 - 11.0 5.5 - 13.0
Week 13: Jan 18 - 24 0 0 4.7 - 11.1 5.5 - 13.2
Week 14: Jan 25 - 31 0 0 4.7 - 11.2 5.6 - 13.3
Week 15: Feb 1 - 7 0 0 4.7 - 11.2 5.6 - 13.3
Table 2 Additional number of GBS cases among vaccinated individuals, November 2, 2009 - February 7, 2010
Projected cumulative additional number of GBS cases
Week of Vaccination Campaign 1992/94 Seasonal Flu
(Lasky et al [10])
1976 Swine Flu
(Schonberger et al [4])
32% coverage 38% coverage 32% coverage 38% coverage
Week 1: Oct 26 - Nov 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Week 2: Nov 2 - Nov 8 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.23
Week 3: Nov 9 - 15 0.16 0.19 1.2 1.4
Week 4: Nov 16 - 22 0.45 0.54 3.4 4.0
Week 5: Nov 23 - 29 0.89 1.1 7.1 8.4
Week 6: Nov 30 - Dec 6 1.6 1.9 12.6 15.0
Week 7: Dec 7 - 13 2.5 3.0 19.7 23.4
Week 8: Dec 14 - 20 3.3 3.9 26.2 31.1
Week 9: Dec 21 - 27 3.8 4.5 30.6 36.4
Week 10: Dec 28 - Jan 3 4.2 4.9 33.1 39.3
Week 11: Jan 4 - 10 4.4 5.2 34.3 40.8
Week 12: Jan 11 - 17 4.5 5.4 34.8 41.3
Week 13: Jan 18 - 24 4.6 5.4 34.9 41.5
Week 14: Jan 25 - 31 4.6 5.5 35.0 41.5
Week 15: Feb 1 - 7 4.6 5.5 35.0 41.5
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before GBS onset [23]. Given that the risk of GBS fol-
lowing influenza is greater than the risk following seaso-
nal vaccine, illness rather than vaccination may have
been the causal factor.
In addition to the background risk of GBS and the
potential risk introduced by vaccination, individuals with
influenza infection are also at risk of developing GBS.
Vaccinated individuals may have become infected with
influenza prior to developing immunity to the vaccine
and therefore would be at risk of developing influenza-
associated GBS. These individuals pose a particular chal-
lenge if they develop GBS as causality is more difficult
to elucidate. Not accounting for this risk in an analysis
of associations between GBS and influenza vaccine
could result in associations inaccurately being attributed
to the vaccine rather than the disease, particularly when
the risk of developing GBS is 40-70 times greater after
influenza than after vaccine [8,10]. This is an especially
important consideration during a pandemic [24], when
it can be expected that influenza cases and vaccination
is occurring concurrently (i.e., they are not mutually
exclusive populations); indeed, a large burden of influ-
enza infection in Ontario occurred prior to availability
of vaccination (Figure 1). This is in contrast to seasonal
influenza when the majority of vaccination occurs prior
to the onset of the influenza season. In our analysis, up
to 31 influenza-associated GBS cases could be expected
to occur among individuals who were infected with
influenza during the period of interest.
There are many limitations in this study. Coverage
estimates were estimated as accurate and timely cover-
age data at the provincial level were not available in
real-time during the campaign. While the coverage esti-
mates used in this study are potentially subject to mis-
classification, they were based on the best information
available at the time. Overestimating coverage would
have resulted in a higher estimate of the number of
baseline and additional number of GBS cases within the
vaccinated cohort, while underestimating coverage
would have resulted in lower estimates. A provincial
report on the pandemic cited an estimate of coverage
that agreed with our overall estimate of 38% [15], while
estimates cited from other sources [14] including sur-
veys [16,17] were within the range explored in this ana-
lysis. We were reassured by the results of our sensitivity
analyses that a lower coverage estimate of 32% did not
change our overall conclusions. Age-sex standardized
GBS rates would overestimate the background number
of GBS cases, as the vaccinated population is younger
than the general population and GBS incidence
increases with age. However, we calculated the Alberta
age-standardized GBS rate among persons less than 60
years of age and the number of background GBS cases
that we would expect would be 7 cases, still within the
calculated range. Although health care providers are leg-
ally required under the Ontario Health Protection and
Promotion Act to report serious adverse events follow-
ing immunization, the number of GBS cases reported to
the province during the period of interest may have
been underestimated as it was based on a passive sur-
veillance system that relied on providers’ notification to
the local public health unit. Providers may not have
reported the GBS case if they did not believe it was
related to the vaccine, or they may have reported it
directly to the vaccine manufacturer, thus by passing the
provincial reporting system. However, given the heigh-
tened awareness surrounding GBS and influenza immu-
nization, it is unlikely that this occurred frequently.
Further, the number of GBS cases in the province was
still well below the upper limit of the expected coinci-
dental GBS baseline range. Finally, when calculating the
number of influenza-related cases of GBS occurring
among the unvaccinated population, we used risk esti-
mates of GBS after ILI rather than influenza infection.
This may have resulted in either an over- or under-esti-
mate of the number of influenza-associated GBS cases
depending on whether influenza is less or more likely to
be associated with GBS than ILI. We also made assump-
tions regarding the actual number of influenza cases
that occurred which produced a wide range of estimated
GBS cases among the unvaccinated population. Assum-
ing that only the unvaccinated population remained at
risk of influenza (and thereby influenza-associated GBS)
would underestimate the number of cases, as infection
with pandemic influenza occurred concurrently with
vaccination. Therefore some vaccinated persons could
also have been infected with influenza and thus eligible
for influenza-associated GBS.
Despite these limitations, the approach used in this
study to estimate expected GBS cases was extremely help-
ful during the H1N1 vaccination campaign to rapidly com-
pare with real-time AEFI reports of GBS allowing us to
detect a potential signal very quickly. Background rates
were calculated in advance of the campaign, as suggested
by Black and co-authors [11], therefore all data were avail-
able prior to receiving AEFI reports. The estimates were
adjusted in real time as vaccine coverage data became
available. During this process a GBS case occurred in a
vaccine recipient [25]. The data were used to provide con-
text to the situation. At that point in time (ie November
28, 2009) we would have expected between 1 and 2 back-
ground cases of GBS reported in the province among a
vaccine recipient, and this was the first case that had been
reported. Having timely information available greatly
assisted with communications, allowed the media to pro-
vide a balanced perspective and helped maintain public
confidence in the vaccination campaign.
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ally have access to timely comprehensive vaccination
coverage data from an immunization registry and accu-
rate data regarding GBS and other AEFI from disease
registries and patient reports. There is no doubt that
this would assist in assessing vaccine-associated adverse
events. Unfortunately, this ideal does not exist in many
jurisdictions and we are left with non-optimal methods
for assessing these events. AEFI surveillance is a core
function of public health that must proceed regardless
of data limitations. Our methodology, which was rela-
tively easy to employ, could be adapted by many juris-
dictions to assist with both AEFI assessment and
communications during mass immunization campaigns.
Conclusions
Awareness of expected rates of GBS is crucial when
assessing adverse events following influenza immuniza-
tion, particularly when an entire population is eligible
for vaccine. Although ecologic in nature, our analysis
does not support an association between H1N1 vaccine
and GBS as the number of cases reported was within
the expected range of background cases occurring in the
province. Attribution of causality for GBS is difficult;
however, it is essential that the risk of GBS following
influenza is taken into account during a pandemic when
vaccination and disease are occurring concurrently to
avoid making spurious associations.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dr. Michael D. Hill for providing the data on
baseline incidence rates of GBS in Alberta.
Author details
1Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada.
2Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada.
3Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada.
4City of Hamilton Public Health Services, Hamilton, Ontario,
Canada.
5Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster
University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
6Department of Laboratory Medicine
and Pathobiology, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Authors’ contributions
SD was the primary author of this paper and was responsible for the overall
study design with contributions from GL, CM and NC. GL was responsible
for the compilation, validation and analysis of data, with contributions from
SD, CA, NC, and LR. MAS and CA provided some of the data used in this
analysis. All authors contributed to the interpretation of the data, critically
reviewed the manuscript and approved the final version of the manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 17 December 2010 Accepted: 17 May 2011
Published: 17 May 2011
References
1. Interim order respecting the sale of the vaccine for the novel influenza
a H1N1 virus. [http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/legislation/
interimorders-arretesurgence/vaccin-eng.php].
2. The Globe and Mail: Health officials scramble to counter H1N1 myths;
Safety and effectiveness of vaccine emphasized in effort to reassure
skeptics as conspiracy theories go viral. Reported by Caroline Alphonso
2009.
3. Ottawa Citizen: Nearly half of Canadians won’t get H1N1 shot: poll;
Health officials try to counter fear, confusion. Reported by Meagan
Fitzpatrick 2009.
4. Schonberger LB, Bregman DJ, Sullivan-Bolyai JZ, Keenlyside RA, Ziegler DW,
Retailliau HF, Eddins DL, Bryan JA: Guillain-Barré syndrome following
vaccination in the National Influenza Immunization Program, United
States, 1976-1977. Am J Epidemiol 1979, 110:105-123.
5. Haber P, Sejvar J, Mikaeloff Y, DeStefano F: Vaccines and Guillain-Barré
syndrome. Drug Saf 2009, 32:309-323.
6. Hauck LJ, White C, Feasby TE, Zochodne DW, Svenson LW, Hill MD:
Incidence of Guillain-Barré syndrome in Alberta, Canada: an
administrative data study. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2008, 79:318-320.
7. Juurlink DN, Stukel TA, Kwong J, Kopp A, McGeer A, Upshur RE, Manuel DG,
Moineddin R, Wilson K: Guillain-Barré syndrome after influenza
vaccination in adults: a population-based study. Arch Intern Med 2006,
166:2217-2221.
8. Sivadon-Tardy V, Orlikowski D, Porcher R, Sharshar T, Durand MC, Enouf V,
Rozenberg F, Caudie C, Annane D, van der Werf S, Lebon P, Raphaël JC,
Gaillard JL, Gault E: Guillain-Barré syndrome and influenza virus infection.
Clin Inf Dis 2009, 48:48-56.
9. Lasky T, Terracciano GJ, Magder L, Koski CL, Ballesteros M, Nash D, Clark S,
Haber P, Stolley PD, Schonberger LB, Chen RT: The Guillain-Barré
syndrome and the 1992-1993 and 1993-1994 influenza vaccines. N Engl
J Med 1998, 339:1797-1802.
10. Stowe J, Andrews N, Wise L, Miller E: Investigation of the temporal
association of Guillain-Barré syndrome with influenza vaccine and
influenza-like illness using the United Kingdom General Practice
Research Database. Am J Epidemiol 2009, 169:382-388.
11. Black S, Eskola J, Siegrist CA, Halsey N, Macdonald N, Law B, Miller E,
Andrews N, Stowe J, Salmon D, Vannice K, Izurieta HS, Akhtar A, Gold M,
Oselka G, Zuber P, Pfeifer D, Vellozzi C: Importance of background rates of
disease in assessment of vaccine safety during mass immunization with
pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccines. Lancet 2009, 374:2115-2122.
12. Statistics Canada: Estimates of population, by age group and sex for July
1, Canada, provinces and territories, annual., CANSIM Table 051-0001.
13. Public Health Agency of Canada: Distribution of the H1N1 vaccine.[http://
origin.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/vacc/dist-eng.php].
14. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Fact Sheet: You Call the
Shot: H1N1 Public Education Campaign. [http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/
news/release/2009/dec/fact_20091218.aspx].
15. The H1N1 Pandemic - How Ontario Fared: A Report by Ontario’s Chief
Medical Officer of Health. [http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/
publications/ministry_reports/cmoh_h1n1/cmoh_h1n1_20100602.pdf].
16. Foisy J, Rosella LC, Sanderson R, Hamid JS, Dhar B, Crowcroft NS: Self
reported influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccination coverage for
Ontario, Canada. Health Reports .
17. Gilmour H, Hofmann N: H1N1 vaccination. Health Reports 21:1-7.
18. Achonu C, LaFreniere M, Gubbay J, Rosella L, Deeks S, Mazzulli T,
Rebbapragada A, Johnson I, Willison D, Johnson C, Chiodo A, Shi L,
Willmore J, Yue C, Tom J, Crowcroft N: A seroprevalence study of
pandemic influenza A H1N1 among Ontarians. European Scientific
Conference on Applied Infectious Disease Epidemiology Abstract Book. Lisbon
2010, 50.
19. Public Health Agency of Canada: Vaccine Surveillance Report - Adverse
Events following Immunization. 2010 [http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-
alerte/h1n1/vacc/addeve-eng.php].
20. Läkemedelverket Medical Products Agency: Final summary of adverse
drug reaction reports in Sweden with Pandemrix through October 2009
- mid April 2010. 2010 [http://www.lakemedelsverket.se/upload/eng-mpa-
se/Pandemrix%20ADRs%20in%20Sweden%2015%20april%202010.pdf].
21. Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency: Final Public
Summary: UK Suspected Adverse Reaction Analysis Swine Flu (H1N1)
Vaccines - Celvapan and Pandemrix - March 26, 2010.[http://www.mhra.
gov.uk/home/groups/pl-p/documents/websiteresources/con078911.pdf].
22. Vellozzi C, Broder KR, Haber P, Guh A, Nguyen M, Cano M, Lewis P,
McNeil MM, Bryant M, Singleton J, Martin D, DeStefano F: Adverse events
following influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccines reported to the
Deeks et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:329
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/329
Page 8 of 9Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, United States, October 1,
2009-January 31, 2010. Vaccine 2010, 28:7248-7255.
23. CDC: Preliminary results: Surveillance for Guillain-Barré syndrome after
receipt of influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine – United States,
2009-2010. MMWR 2010, 59:657-661.
24. Lehmann HC, Hartung HP, Kieseier BC, Hughes RAC: Guillain-Barré
syndrome after exposure to influenza virus. Lancet Infect Dis 2010,
10:643-651.
25. The Hamilton Spectator: Resident gets Guillain-Barré after H1N1 shot.
Reported by Joanna Frketich 2009.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/329/prepub
doi:10.1186/1471-2458-11-329
Cite this article as: Deeks et al.: Estimating background rates of Guillain-
Barré Syndrome in Ontario in order to respond to safety concerns
during pandemic H1N1/09 immunization campaign. BMC Public Health
2011 11:329.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Deeks et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:329
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/329
Page 9 of 9